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ABSTRACT By the proliferation of electric vehicles (EVs) in power systems, it is needed to manage their
demand energy within a regulated market framework. From the market perspective, integration of different
market players, such as the energy producers, aggregators, and loads, could complicate the system operation
and management. Therefore, an appropriate model of the market that shows the exact behavior of the system
components is needed. In this paper, a new tri-level game theoretical approach for energymanagement of EVs
and EV charging stations (EVCSs) as independent decision makers for their energy scenarios is proposed.
To make it practical for a real power system, the system operator is also included in the proposed method
as a master decision maker. Therefore, EVs’ and EVCSs’ objectives are to maximize their financial profits,
while the system operator indirectly controls their energy scenarios in order to fulfill the system’s technical
constraints. To do so, at the highest level of the proposed method, technical goals of the system, which are
related to the system operational condition, will be followed as the objective criteria. At the second level of
the designed model, the EVCSs financial objectives are optimized. In the third level of the proposed method,
it is tried to minimize the EVs’ cost function. The method is tested on an IEEE 9-bus standard system, and the
results show a superior performance of the proposed energy management system (EMS) compared with the
conventional EMS methods in terms of technical and financial objectives. In this way, it is shown that in
the case of considering only one aspect of the system, either financial or technical, the other aspects of the
system may not be satisfied. Hence, it is essential to consider both the financial and technical aspects of the
system simultaneously, in order to operate the system optimally and securely.
INDEX TERMS Energy management system, electric vehicle, electric vehicle charging station, tri-level
game theory.
NOMENCLATURE
A. ABBREVIATIONS
EV Electric Vehicle
EVCS Electric vehicle charging station
SO System operator
EMS Energy Management System
Tri-level game A game including three levels
Bi-level game A game including two levels
PV Generator bus
PQ Load bus
NE Nash Equilibrium
B. SYMBOLS
σ i Mixed strategy chosen by player i
ui Payoff value of the player i
UEV Objective function of the electric vehicle
UEVCS Objective function of the electric vehicle charging
station
sij j
th Strategy chosen by player i
S Space of the possible pure strategies in the game
β i Optimal payoff value of the player i
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pEVCS Electricity price set by electric vehicle charging
station
xEV Consumed load by electric vehicle
N A set of players in the game
I. INTRODUCTION
Restructuring of the power system and rethinking innovation
in emerging energy markets have resulted in new paradigms
for energy management systems (EMSs). In smart energy
systems, not only the supply side but also the loads are
controlled based on the system’s information in order to
meet one or more objectives [1]. Considering Electric Vehi-
cles (EVs) as mobile electric load/storage devices, the high
penetration of EVs poses new challenges in operation man-
agement of smart energy systems [2].
The energy management problem of the power system
is well known as an optimization problem in related litera-
ture [3]–[6], which can be solved by different optimization
techniques. On the other hand, by increasing the penetration
of EVs in the system, the EMS of the power system including
the EVs becomes one of the main concerns of both the system
operators and industry [7]. From the EV producers point of
view, technical aspects, which influence the EV battery such
as deep-discharge in addition to the cost of the large battery,
are the main concerns [8]. Therefore, an appropriate energy
management design of the EVs battery can help to improve
the life cycle of the system [9]. In order to protect the EV
battery, different control strategies are developed, which are
classified and discussed in [10]. On the other hand, system
operators consider the EVs as mobile energy components,
which can consume and inject energy into the system at
different points of the grid. This fact provokes the energy
management of the EVs in the grid a more complex problem
in the EMS point of view compared to the conventional EMS
with fixed loads [11]–[13]. The challenge of EMS design
for EVs can become worse as both the electrical load and
the grid show uncertain behavior [14]. Introducing EVs into
power markets may increase the electricity consumption.
In this way, studying EVs impact on power systems may be
divided into two main categories: 1) Economic evaluation,
which may be related to peak load shaving and load valley
filling [15]–[18], and 2) Assessment of EVs impact on tech-
nical power systems’ features, such as energy loss, frequency
control, reactive power compensation [19]–[21].
EVs may be assumed to be as independent decision mak-
ers, which are able to decide where to be connected to
and how much energy is received from the grid. Although
a high penetration of EVs in power systems may cause
new challenges for EMSs, by applying appropriate opera-
tion management and control methods, the system behavior
may be improved [22]. Basically, an EV owner may act in
order to minimize his/her cost function. On the other hand,
the electricity supplier, which is another independent decision
maker, may set higher electricity prices to make more money
and maximize its profit. In this double-sided energy market
environment, the EMS may be considered as a game among
EV owners and the grid operator or their related agents [23].
Introducing the game-theoretical approach provides oppor-
tunities to involve system components such as loads and
energy sources into the EMS problem [24]–[26]. In this way,
the load side management can be obtained by involving them
into the game [27].What is followed inmost game-theoretical
approaches is to design a structure of a game in which every
player tries to maximize its own profit as well as optimizing
the whole system objective. In this way, one or some Nash
Equilibrium points is defined as the objective point of the
game in which the game may eventually converge to it [28].
To address the problem, many attempts have been devoted
in respect of analyzing and modeling of the EMS in order
to achieve an optimal EV charging strategy [23], [29]–[32].
In [29], a game-theoretical approach for EMS is developed
in order to schedule EVs’ demand energy and aggregator’s
profit. In this attempt, both cooperative and competitive game
approaches are studied to model the EVs strategies. In [30],
an aggregator is considered as a leader which sets the elec-
tricity price, while EVs act as followers, which decide how
much energy to purchase from or sell to the aggregator. In this
approach, it is shown that cooperative models lead to higher
system stability compared with competitive models in the
presence of uncertain demands. In [23], a non-cooperative
leader-followers game between the Smart Grid (SG) and
groups of EVs is designed. To do so, the SG sets the electricity
price based on the estimation of EVs’ response. Then, EVs
decide the energy consumption based on the electricity price.
Unlike [23], [29], and [30], which mainly represent
one-leader-multi-followers EMS strategy for EVs, in [31]
and [32], multi-leaders-one-follower strategies are repre-
sented in order to evaluate EMS of EVs from different points
of view. In [31], EV aggregators are considered as leaders,
while system operator is considered as the follower, which
tries to minimize the operation cost. In [32], a competitive
game among Electric Vehicles Charging Stations (EVCSs) is
designed in order to maximize their profit. In the same work,
it is assumed that EVs are uniformly distributed in a given
area and choose where to charge based on the electricity price
and their distances to the EVCSs.
Researchers in [33]–[35] have developed a multi-leader
multi-follower game in order to manage the energy among
EVs and EVCSs. In [33], at an upper level, EVCSs com-
pete with each other in order to maximize their utility. At a
lower-level, EVs may cooperate with each other and act as
a group to negotiate to charge a price to the upper-level in
order to minimize their energy costs. In [34], another multi-
leader multi-follower game among the EVs and EVCSs are
developed, where EVs compete among each other to min-
imize their costs. EVCSs are also competing against each
other in order to maximize their profits. In [35], EVs are
considered as leaders and EVCSs are assumed to be the
followers. Determining which player is the leader and which
one is the follower should be defined in the game rules.
EV may be defined either as a leader of a follower based
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FIGURE 1. Power system graph including electric vehicles, electric vehicle charging station, and the system operator.
on the game rule. To the best authors’ knowledge, none of
the aforementioned works considered the EMS for EVs and
EVCSs as a hierarchical game, and simultaneously optimize
the system operator’s objective.
In this paper, a three-level game theoretical approach is
designed for EMS in order to optimize the system operator’s
objective in addition to maximizing the EVCSs and EVs util-
ity functions. Therefore, at the highest level (Level 1), the sys-
tem operator will try to distribute loads among the system
by applying indirect control signals. Then, in a lower-level
(Level 2), EVCSs will try to maximize their profit by provid-
ing more power with higher prices. At the lowest level of this
tri-level game (Level 3), EVs will choose where to charge,
based on their position and the EVCS’s electricity price. The
whole scope of the grid is shown in Fig. 1. The novelty of this
work are listed as follows:
• Three-level game is designed in order to consider EVs,
EVCSs, and the system operator. The system operator
attends the game by applying its incentive program,
while EVCSs compete to absorb more EVs to increase
their benefit. In the lowest level of the game, EVs choose
where to be charged and how much energy to consume
in order to maximize their benefits.
• Financial optimization in addition to technical goals are
both considered in the objective function of the pro-
posed method. This is considered as a multi-objective
optimization problem, which both involves financial and
technical objectives.
• In simulate a more realistic case, energy aggregators are
defined as independent energy sellers, which are able to
set the electricity price independently. This inevitably
makes the game more complex, which is a leader-
followers/leaders-followers Stackelberg game. This is
discussed in details in Section III.A.
In the proposed method, the system’s technical constraints
in addition to players’ financial benefits are considered in
one single game. A master-slave relation is defined between
Levels 1 and 2 and Levels 2 and 3 respectively, where the
system operator acts as a master for EVCSs in the upper
two levels and EVCS takes the master role for EVs in the
lower two levels. System operator controls loads (e.g. EVs)
in an indirect manner. This means that, by participating in
the game, direct load control methods such as costly load
shedding and load curtailment are not necessary.
The basic power system of the proposed method is
designed in DigSilent software and the game is solved
in GAMS. Then, a co-simulation tool between the men-
tioned platforms is established to simulate a real market
environment.
The following sections are defined as follows: Smart
game theoretical-based EMS is defined in Section II.
In Section III, the proposed method for designing tri-level
game EMS of EVs, EVCSs, and the system operator
is introduced in detail. Then, in Section IV simulation
results together with the performance evaluation of the pro-
posed method is illustrated. Finally, Section V presents
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a concise summary of the results along with the major
conclusions.
II. SMART ENERGY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
In this Section, the game theoretical-based EMS will be
explained. To do so, first, the concept of leader-follower game
theory is presented.
A. STACKELBERG GAME PERSPECTIVE
To model a game in a mathematical language, first, the game
components may be defined. Each game includes some play-
ers, strategies, payoffs, and rules. In every game, each player
has some actions, and each player may choose an action in
order to reach its goal. Eventually, the game may converge
in a point, called Nash equilibrium point, in which no player
may be interested in changing its action. A game may have
either no Nash equilibrium point or some [36].
Stackelberg game is a kind of game in which players may
act with a sequence. This kind of game is popular in energy
systems [37]. The leader is defined as a player which may
dominate other players by its strategy. Followers are those
who act in respect to the leader’s strategy.
A game among some players may be modeled as an opti-
mization problem. Assume there are n numbers of players,
e.g. player 1, 2. . . and n. A finite game may be introduced by
a finite ordered list of elements as shown below:
0 =
(
N ,
{
S i
}
i∈N
,
{
ui
}
i∈N
)
(1)
where S i and ui indicate space of strategies and payoff func-
tion of player i, respectively. N presents a set of players in the
game. The space of possible pure strategies in game 0 is the
product of all players’ space strategies, as follows:
S =
∏
i∈N
S i (2)
Let define σ i as a mixed strategy of player i. A mixed strategy
of player i is a probability distribution over the space S i. The
Nash equilibrium may be defined as a mixed strategy (σ ∗) in
which no player may gain a better payoff by only changing
its strategy and leave other players’ strategies fix. This is
illustrated as follows:∑
i∈N
(
ui
(
σ ∗−i, σ i
))
≤
∑
i∈N
(
ui
(
σ ∗
))
(3)
in which
∑
i∈N
is space of all mixed strategies of player i.
ui
(
σ ∗−i, σ i
)
denotes the payoff of a mixed strategy when all
players except player i choose the Nash equilibrium point. Let
define β i as the optimal payoff to player i. To find the optimal
payoff to player i, the following optimization problemmay be
introduced:
min β i − ui (σ )
s.t. ui
(
σ−i, sij
)
− β i ≤ 0, ∀j = 1, . . . ,mi∑mi
j=1
ui (σ ) = 1, 0 ≤ ui (σ ), ∀j = 1, . . . ,mi (4)
where ui
(
σ−i, sij
)
is the payoff of player i in which it chooses
the jth strategy.
To find the Nash equilibrium for the game 0, an optimal
solution for all players may be included in the objective of
the optimization problem as follows:
min
∑
i∈N
β i − ui (σ )
s.t. ui
(
σ−i, sij
)
− β i ≤ 0, ∀j = 1, . . . ,mi∑mi
j=1
ui (σ ) = 1, 0 ≤ ui (σ ), ∀j = 1, . . . ,mi (5)
It is proved in the literature that for every finite game
with a Nash equilibrium, there is a feasible optimum
solution [36], [38].
B. GAME-THEORETICAL APPROACH FOR
ENERGY MANAGEMENT OF EVs
In this Section, the game-theoretical approach applied in
EMS is explained. To present the game in mathematical
format, game components may be defined. In this manner,
there are two types of game players: EVs and EVCSs. The
EVs’ strategy is to determine the value of energy bought from
EVCSs andwhich EVCS theymay choose. On the other hand,
EVCSs’ strategy is to set a price for the electricity. Talking
about the rules for this game, first, each EVCS announces its
price without knowing other EVCSs’ strategy in choosing the
electrical price. This means that EVCSs compete with each
other in order to obtain more financial benefits. In another
scenario, EVCSs may be aware of other EVCSs’ electricity
price. In this regard, they cooperate with each other in order
to achieve more profit.
In this scenario, EVs act as followers, while EVCSs are
leaders. Then, EVs may choose where to be charged and how
much energy they may buy from the EVCSs.
To determine the EVs’ payoff, it should be noted that each
EV owner may be more satisfied if the car gets more charged.
The reason is that by absorbing more energy, one may drive
further in distance in addition to long-term recharging is
needed. Then payoffs may be a non-decreasing function in
respect of energy consumption as follows:
∂UEV
∂xEV
≥ 0 (6)
where UEV and xEV are payoffs of each EV and the load
consumption, respectively. On the other hand, the relationship
between the consumption load and the level of satisfaction is
not linear. As more energy is consumed, the level of satisfac-
tion gets saturated as follows [23]:
∂2UEV
∂x2EV
≤ 0 (7)
In addition to the aforementioned characteristics regarding
the payoff of EVs, it should be noted that consuming energy
may be paid by EVs. This means that EVs do not wish to buy
expensive electricity. Therefore, the level of satisfaction may
67226 VOLUME 6, 2018
B. Shakerighadi et al.: Hierarchical Game Theoretical Approach for Energy Management of EVs and Charging Stations
be decreased by increasing in the value of the electricity price.
Mathematically,
∂UEV
∂p
≤ 0 (8)
where p is the electricity price consumed by the EV. In the
case that there are some energy producers, each EVCS may
introduce its own electricity price. There are also some other
items that affect the desirability of the EV to be charged
in an EVCS. Traveling cost including the distance of the
EV from the EVCS and traffic jam in addition to waiting
time at the station may be considered in the EV payoff
function [23]. Although these factors can be included in the
objective function of the EV, without losing the generality and
for the sake of simplicity, they are neglected in the EV payoff
function. Considering (5)-(7), the following equation may be
considered as the payoff function of each EV:
UEV = a1 · xEV − a2 · x2EV − p · xEV (9)
where a1 and a2 may have some fixed or variable values,
yet they should be positive in order to satisfy (5) and (6).
It is important to choose an appropriate value for a1 and a2
in order to model the accurate behavior of the EVs, as they
may affect the level of satisfaction in the EV. a1 is related to
the capacity of the EV’s battery. Higher values for a1 shows
higher battery capacity of the EV, which means that more
energy is required for the EV to approach its maximum
fulfillment. In addition, a2 indicates the different behaviors
of the EV owners. For example, when the battery of the EV is
almost empty, then EV owners desire to charge its EV battery
more than the time that it is almost full. In this case, one
single EV can behave differently based on its desired energy
consumption. By choosing a different value for a2, the various
satisfaction level of the EVs with an equal battery capacity
will be reached. This is shown in Fig. 2.
FIGURE 2. Payoff function for one single EV with different values of
the a2. The (b) is a constant positive real value.
To determine payoff for the EVCS, the effects of two
variables may be assessed: the value of the electricity price
and the amount of energy to be sold. If there are some EVCSs
in the grid, they may cooperate with each other or compete in
order to maximize their profit independently. In the former
scenario, one single objective function can be defined to
include all EVCSs’ payoffs. In the latter, each EVCS tries
to maximize its own payoff with/without considering other
EVCSs’ actions. In the more advanced scenario, each EVCS
may learn how other players act. Then, it may modify its
action in the next iteration of the game.
A very simple payoff for an EVCS can be presented as:
UEVCS = pEVCS
∑
n
xn (10)
in which UEVCS and pEVCS are the payoff and the suggested
price introduced by the EVCS. In this way, by increasing
its suggested electricity price, each EVCS may increase its
payoff. On the other hand, the electricity price is introduced
in the payoff of the EVs as a negative factor. Then, if the elec-
tricity price increases, EVs may try to consume less energy,
whichmeans
∑
n xnmay decrease. Consequently,UEVCS may
decrease.
At the highest level related to the operational conditions,
the system operator may implement some incentive programs
in order to reach its goal. Here, the incentive program is
defined by paying money to EVCSs that are located far from
the load center or reducing their taxes in order to motivate
them to sell the energy with less electricity price. In this
way, the EVs will be encouraged to purchase the energy from
the mentioned EVCSs, which are not located in the load
center. This makes the system load to be distributed in the
system, hence operational constraints of the system (in this
case voltage magnitude of the bus bars) will be satisfied.
To mathematically model the abovementioned discussion,
the objective function of the system operator and its con-
straints need to be modeled. To do so, the objective of the
system operator is to minimize its cost (economic incentive),
which it pays to the EVCSs. On the other hand, its con-
straint is to keep the bus bars voltage magnitude with their
boundaries. The objective of the system operator can also be
related to some other constraints of the system such as line
current. Here, without losing the generality of the method,
the constraint of the optimization problem of the system
operator is chosen to keep the bus bar voltage magnitudes
with their boundaries, while this could be some other aims of
the system. In addition, the line current limits are supposed to
be considerably high in order to not be violated in the model.
Therefore, the formulation of this level is shown as follows:
min Cost F. =
∑
j
pSOjxj, ∀j = 1, . . . ,m
s.t. |Vi| ≥ D, ∀i = 1, . . . , b (11)
Where psoj is the incentive electricity price dedicated to the
jth EVCS with xj amount of energy for m number of EVCS.
In addition, |Vi| is the voltage magnitude of the ith bus from
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b number of buses, which should be more than a marginal
value, D.
With all this in mind, the whole problem can be introduced
as a leaders-followers game as follows:
System Operator (leaders):
min Cost F. =
∑
j
pSOjxj, ∀j = 1, . . . ,m
s.t. |Vi| ≥ D, ∀i = 1, . . . , b
EVCSs (leaders for EVs and followers for the System
Operator):
max UEVCSj =
(
pEVCSj − pSOj
)∑
n
xn
s.t.
∑
n
xn ≤ C
pEVCS≥0
EVs (followers):
max UEV = a1 · xEV − a2 · x2EV − pEVCS · xEV
s.t. xn ≥ 0 (12)
Equation (12) shows that each player has its own objective
function. To solve the optimization problem of (12), back-
wardmethods can be employed. In this regard, first followers’
objective function is optimized. In this step, electricity price
is considered as a constant value. Then, energy quantity is
determined based on the value of the electricity price. Next,
EVCSs’ objective function is optimized. In this step, energy
quantity is replaced by the value determined in the last step.
This means that the leader (e.g. EVCS) already knows about
the follower’s (e.g. EV’s) decision, which gives the EVCSs
the advantage of reaching a better point in the optimization
problem.
III. DESIGNED TRI-LEVEL GAME FOR EVs, EVCSs,
AND THE SYSTEM OPERATOR
In this section, first, the logic of the designed game is
described. Then, the mathematical model of the proposed
method will be explained.
A. LOGIC OF THE DESIGNED GAME
Regarding the payoffs of the players and their decision vari-
ables, there are three levels of players in the proposedmethod:
Level 3: EVs; Level 2: EVCSs; and Level 1: System operator.
For each level, a different objective function is defined as
follows:
• Level 3: EVs
At this level, EVs compete with each other in order to min-
imize their cost function. Their decision variables may be
choosing where and how much to be charged. Each EV may
be unaware of other EVs decision. Although prediction of
other players action can lead to a better decision making for
each individual EV, this is not the subject matter of this paper.
To do so, it is recommended that the last actions of the other
players are involved in each EV’s objective function.
• Level 2: EVCSs
At this level, EVCSs try to maximize their profit by selling
more energy at higher prices. On the other hand, as there
are some EVCSs distributed in the system, EVs may choose
more desirable EVCS with a reasonable price. The value of
desirability is determined by the EVs’ need. For example,
an EVCS near to the city center may be more desirable
compared to the one, which is placed on the suburbs. The
variable, which is controlled by EVCSs is their electricity
price.
• Level 1: System Operator
This is the highest level in the hierarchical game for the EMS.
One of the main goals of the system operator is to keep the
system working all the time considering operational features
such as power quality, stability, etc. On the other hand, EVs
charging behaviormay affect the system condition negatively,
like increasing distribution transformer losses, voltage devia-
tion, etc. [39], [40]. In this paper, the effect of EVs on system
nodal voltages is studied. Other system characteristics may
also be considered as an objective of the system operator,
which it is out of the scope of this paper.
FIGURE 3. Architecture of the hierarchical game theoretic approach of
energy management for EVs, EVCSs, and the system operator.
The whole process of the tri-level game theoretic approach
for EMS is illustrated in Fig. 3. Therefore, the game starts
with the highest level (Level 1), e.g. system operator. In this
step, system operator checks if the system variable (voltage
magnitude) is in its desired limits. If all bus voltages are
within their limits, the system operator will not apply any
penalty to EVCSs’ decision. On the other hand, if some volt-
age deviations occur, the system operator will apply an indi-
rect control method in order to make its followers to change
their decisions. To do so, the EVCS, which causes voltage
drop, may pay a surcharge. As a consequence, the EVCSmay
wish to sell less energy in order to pay less surcharge. Then,
the voltage may be restored to the allowed range.
In the second step of the game, EVCSs try to maximize
their economic profit. As the numbers of EVs is limited,
EVCSs have to compete against each other to attract more
EVs in order to sell more energy. The only action which
may be controlled by EVCSs is the electricity price. As it
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is assumed that each EVCS acts independently, they have
no information about the others’ actions. Therefore, each
EVCS sets its own electricity price. To maximize its profit,
every EVCS has to consider all possible conditions in order
to find out what the best action is. In this manner, different
conditions should be considered by EVCSs: 1) What is the
best electricity price if all EVs are charged in the considered
EVCS? 2) What is the best action if only some EVs choose
to be charged in the considered EVCS?
In step three of the game, EVs may compete with each
other in order to pay less money with more satisfaction
degree. Their decision variables are choosing the desired
EVCS to be charged in addition to determining the amount of
energy to be consumed. They may have no information about
other EVs’ decision. To make the competition fair, all EVs
are assumed to act simultaneously in respect to their deci-
sion ([41], [42]. As each EVCSmay provide a limited amount
of energy, EVs which make more profit for the EVCS may be
charged there. In this regard, the EVs compete with each other
by determining the optimum amount of energy and the best
EVCS; i.e. the EVCS which provides cheaper energy blocks
in comparison with other EVCSs. The optimum amount of
energy may be calculated by the objective function of the EV.
B. ALGORITHM OF THE DESIGNED GAME
To present the algorithm of the tri-level game, it should be
noted that each leader (upper-level) knows how its followers
(lower-level) may act in response to its strategy. Therefore,
action series follows a top-down process, while the three-level
optimization process is done in a bottom-up fashion as shown
in Fig. 4. This means that, first of all, the optimization prob-
lem for the EVs is solved considering
EVCSs’ action as a constant. Then, EVCSs optimize their
profit based on the information determined in the last step.
After determining the optimal value for the objective func-
tion of the EVCSs, the system operator may use the lower
level information to optimize its own payoff. This technique
is called backward induction technique to find aNash equilib-
rium point in leader-follower games, as shown in Fig. 4 [43].
The process of optimization begins in EVs and ends with
the system operator. The hierarchical optimization process is
illustrated in the algorithm shown in Table 1.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
To evaluate the proposed method, three scenarios are con-
sidered: 1) Blind scenario; in which there is no informa-
tion exchange among EVs, EVCSs, and the system operator.
2) Conventional EMS including a bi-level game; in which
EVs and EVCSs receive and send information among each
other. Yet, the system operator is not included in the game.
3) The proposed method; in which a tri-level game is intro-
duced for the EMS.
The IEEE 9-bus standard system as shown in Fig. 5 is
used as a testbed for verifying the proposed method, which is
mainly used for system-level studies. The DigSilent software
is used for simulating the electrical network. In addition,
FIGURE 4. Backward induction technique to find a Nash equilibrium
point in leader-follower games for the proposed method.
GAMS programming software is used for doing the optimiza-
tion process.
A. SCENARIO 1 (BLIND SCENARIO)
In this scenario, EVs have no information about the electricity
price. Therefore, they will charge their battery based on their
battery state-of-the-charge, and the closest EVCS. It is worth
mentioning that the EVs will still try to optimize their benefit,
although this is not a game among EVs or EVCSs. The reason
is that each player makes its decision based on its own benefit
and no information from other players. In addition, player’s
decision has no effect on the other players’ decisions.
It is further assumed that the load center is located at
Bus 5 and Bus 6. In this circumstance, some EVs will be
charged at Bus 5 and some of them will choose Bus 6.
For this scenario, the player’s objectives are not modeled,
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FIGURE 5. IEEE 9-bus system, considering Buses 5 and 6 as EVCSs.
TABLE 1. Three-level algorithm for the proposed method.
but randomly distributed in the system in order to have a
better feeling of the next two scenarios. Therefore, active
power in Bus 5 and Bus 6 are equal to 165 MW and
TABLE 2. IEEE 9-bus voltage magnitude in a blind load scenario.
125 MW, respectively. It is worth mentioning that also these
values are much bigger than an EV, which its scale is in some
kW, it makes sense when an integration of EVs are consid-
ered. Therefore, an aggregation of the EVs are considered as
the load. Table 2 shows the load flow results in which bus
voltage magnitudes are indicated. Bus voltage magnitude is a
key characteristic of the system which can help the operator
to keep the system stable. Therefore, it is used in order to
indicate either the system runs in a safe mode or not.
Let the marginal point of the voltage magnitude be equal to
0.925 p.u. It is worth mentioning that this value may differ in
different systems with some other operator’s objectives. As it
is indicated in Table 2, the voltage magnitude of Bus 5 is
below the marginal point (0.93 p.u.). It means that if EVs
try to charge their battery based on their preferred location,
there may be an operational challenge in the system. In the
next parts, the effect of introducing a game to the system
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players will be presented. It will show that all games do not
necessarily have benefit for the system operator. Therefore,
including the system operator as a leader in the game will
improve system operational mode in addition to players’
benefit.
B. SCENARIO 2 (CONVENTIONAL EMS WITH
A BI-LEVEL GAME)
In this scenario, a game among EVs and EVCSs are devel-
oped based on economic benefit. System’s operational con-
ditions are not included in this stage. Each EV tries to spend
less price for the same value of the energy. This makes a
game among EVCSs in order to attract more EVs. As it
is assumed EVCSs have no information about each other’s
suggested price, then EVCSs (located in Bus 4 and 5) try to
maximize their profit by setting the highest possible value of
the electricity.
This bi-level game is considered as a Stackelberg game.
Here, the EVCSs act as leaders and EVs are considered as
followers. According to the backward induction technique
explained in the previous section, the optimization starts from
Level 2 and continues to the Level 3; see Fig. 4. Level 1, as it is
related to the system operator, is not included in this scenario.
Therefore, this scenario is a special case of scenario 3, which
is not necessarily the best possible equilibrium point (will be
discussed in the next part).
Here, two EV types are considered as the aggregation of
the EVs. This means that EV 1 presents a group EVs and
decide for them as an aggregator. Each EV try to optimize
its own objective function. It does not necessarily mean that
EVs are charged in the EVCS in which electricity price is
cheaper. Indeed, the EVCS that suggests the lower price and
is closer to the load center will attract EVs; see Table 3.
Here, although EVCS 1 suggests a higher price for the unit
MW, it still attracts both EV aggregators. The reason is that
EVCS 1 is more desired for EVs based on their objective
function. The tendency of each EV to each EVCS is called the
desired function. Here, each EV has two desired functions.
For simplification, the desired function for EVs are indicated
as follows:
EV ′1s desired function in respect to CS1
= 10 · x1 − x21 − p1 · x1
EV ′1s desired function in respect to CS2
= 10 · x1 − x21 − p2 · x1
EV ′2s desired function in respect to CS1
= 12 · x2 − x22 − p1 · x2
EV ′2s desired function in respect to CS2
= 9 · x2 − x22 − p2 · x2 (13)
Accordingly, if all EVs try to be charged in EVCS 1 in
order to optimize their objective function, the voltage mag-
nitude at Bus 5 (EVCS 1) will dramatically fall; see Table 4.
This is not acceptable regarding the system operational con-
straints. According to Table 3, Bus 5 voltage magnitude is
TABLE 3. EVs and EVCSs transaction information in scenario 2.
TABLE 4. IEEE 9-bus voltage magnitude in a two-level scenario.
not only improved but also decreased in comparison with
Scenario 1.
C. SCENARIO 3 (THE PROPOSED METHOD)
In this scenario, the system operator also participates in the
game as a leader for EVCSs. In addition, EVCSs act as lead-
ers for the EVs. This means that the system operator controls
the EVs indirectly. In this way, all players including energy
consumers, energy providers, and system operators, will be
involved in EMS. It is worth mentioning that by applying the
tri-level game, no player is forced to make a decision, or is
directly controlled by any other player.
To include the system operator in the game, its objective
and decisions should be determined. The objective of the
system operator is to maintain bus voltage magnitudes within
the allowed range, for instance, upper than 0.93 p.u. and
lower than 1.06 p.u. Its decision variable is the amount of
incentive applied to EVCSs. This incentive strategy is widely
used in economic problems. With all this in mind, the system
operator tries to balance the load among EVCSs. By doing
so, it is expected that the voltage magnitudes in all buses are
maintained within the limits.
Table 5 shows the voltagemagnitude of buses regarding the
Scenario 3. What can be concluded from this table is that all
bus voltages are more than 0.93 p.u., which is desired from
the system operator point of view.
The system operator’s objective is achieved by applying
the incentive method. This means that system operator intro-
duces an economic incentive to EVCS 2, which is the less
desired EVCS from the EVs viewpoint. By increasing the
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TABLE 5. IEEE 9-bus voltage magnitude in Three-level scenario.
FIGURE 6. Suggested electricity price by EVCS 1 and EVCS 2, considering
system operator incentive strategy.
incentive value, EVCS 2 can provide the electricity at less
price to its customers, i.e. EVs. This decrease in electricity
price by EVCS 2 will continue until some EVs tend to be
charged in EVCS 2 instead of EVCS 1. This decrease in
electricity price is shown in Fig. 6. The blue and column
show the electricity price introduced by EVCS 1 and EVCS 2,
respectively. As it can be seen from Fig. 6, electricity price
introduced by EVCS 1 maintains fixed through different
incentives introduced by the system operator. On the other
hand, by increasing the economic incentive for EVCS 2,
the electricity price introduced by EVCS 2 will decrease.
There will be an equilibrium point in which EVs tend to be
charged at EVCS 2 because of its cheap electricity price.
By doing so, loads will be shifted from EVCS 1 to EVCS 2,
which distributes the load among the power system.
By introducing an incentive strategy from the system oper-
ator, the EV type 1 and 2 are distributed between EVCS 1 and
EVCS 2. This is shown in Table 6. In this table, it is also
shown that while EVCS 2 is less desired in respect of EVs,
as it introduced much less electricity price compared to
EVCS 1, some EVs will tend to be charged at EVCS 2.
In summary, by designing an appropriate game in the sys-
tem, all parties’ objective functions will be satisfied, while in
the case that only EVs and EVCSs are considered in the game,
operational challenges will be caused for the system operator.
TABLE 6. EVs and EVCSs transaction information in scenario 3.
This can be seen by comparing results in Scenario 2 and
Scenario 3.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a hierarchical game-theoretic approach has been
used in order to solve the EMS problem for EVs, EVCSs,
and the system operator. In this game, EVs acted as EVCSs’
followers, while at a higher level, the system operator played
as the leader for EVCSs. The system operator objective is
to meet the system security constraints. To do so, it applies
a surcharge program to its followers, which are EVCSs.
At the second level EVCSs try to maximize their benefits
by selling more energy to EVs at a higher price. The input
for the EVCSs are the incentives from the system operator
and the amount of energy consumed by EVs. By solving
the EVCS optimization problem, electricity prices are set by
each EVCS. Then, at the lowest level, EVs try to minimize
their cost. They apply the electricity prices set by the EVCSs
into their objective function and try to choose the lowest
offered price and more desired EVCS. It is shown in the
results that the more desired EVCS is not necessarily the
EVCS with the lowest offered price. It was shown that if
the system operator’s role is neglected in the game, this may
cause operational challenges. In this way, the main outcomes
of this paper are as follows:
1) In order to apply a game-theoretic approach for EVs
in the energy market, it is recommended to include system
technical constraints in the EMS. Unless the system opera-
tional state variables may be out of their boundaries in order
to satisfy the economic benefits of the EVs.
2) By applying a surcharge program introduced by the
system operator to the energy aggregators, state variables of
the system can be controlled in themarket platform indirectly.
By using the proposed method, economic profits and oper-
ational challenges of the system components were modeled
simultaneously. Therefore, both aspects of the system were
improved.
Future works can be directed to the following aspects: First
of all, there are some other technical points of the system such
as line current limitations and power quality effects of the
EVs in the main grid, which can be included in the system
operator’s constraints. To do so, transmission system operator
can be involved into the game as the leader for EVCSs in
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order to satisfy line current limits. This will introduce a
tri-level game with multi-objective optimization problem in
each level. Although this may seem more complex, it is a
more realistic problem. Second, the game can be designed in
different ways in order to evaluate the best possible game-
theoretic approach structure from the point of components
view. For instance, the cooperation and competition game can
be compared for the EVCSs in order to evaluate that in what
circumstance they will be more satisfied.
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